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RESEARCH PAPER
The Role of Ideal Affect in the Experience and Memory
of Emotions
Christie Napa Scollon Æ Amanda Hiles Howard Æ Amanda E. Caldwell Æ
Sachiyo Ito
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007
Abstract According to Affect Valuation Theory (Tsai et al. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 54, 1031–1039), culture influences how people want to feel (ideal
affect). Integrating Affect Valuation Theory with the Time-sequential Framework of
Subjective Well-being (Kim-Prieto et al. Journal of Happiness Studies, 6, 261–300), we
proposed that cultural norms influence the memory, but not the experience, of emotion.
The present study examined the role of ideal affect in relation to experience sampling and
retrospective reports of emotion. Ideal affect correlated with retrospective reports but not
experience sampling reports. Extraversion and neuroticism were more strongly related to
experience sampling reports than to ideal levels of emotion. Results suggest that retro-
spective reports of emotion involve a dynamic process that incorporates cultural
information into the reconstruction whereas on-line emotions are more constrained by
temperament.
Keywords Affect  Emotion  Norms  Experience sampling  Subjective well-being
1 Introduction
How do people recall their emotional experiences? Kim-Prieto et al. (2005) proposed that
retrospective accounts of emotional experience are dynamic reflections of the way emo-
tions are shaped and modified through time. Evidence for their idea comes from
observations that experience sampling or on-line emotion reports and retrospective reports
correlate positively, but the correlations are often far from unity suggesting that memory
for emotion is not an exact duplicate of the experience itself. Kim-Prieto et al. and others
(e.g., Robinson and Clore 2002) have noted that one reason for the discrepancy between
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on-line and retrospective reports is that memories of emotion are not encoded in memory in
a permanent form. Instead, people constantly reconstruct emotional memories based on
current values, beliefs, motivations, etc. Of particular interest to the present study are the
cultural values and norms that potentially guide the reconstruction process.
1.1 Testing the Time-sequential Framework of Subjective Well-being
According to the Time-sequential Framework of Subjective Well-being (Kim-Prieto et al.
2005), subjective emotional experience is a dynamic multilevel phenomenon that unfolds
over time. Several sources intervene between the momentary experience and the recall of
that experience. These sources act as heuristic information to help ‘‘fill in the gaps’’ of
memory by guiding the reconstructed memory in a way that is consistent with the heuristic,
even if this results in a less accurate memory. One source that potentially guides memory
for emotions is culture. In a study by Oishi (2002), European American and Asian
American students recorded their emotions in daily diaries (Study 1) and using experience
sampling methodology (Study 2) for 1 week. No cultural differences emerged in the daily
or experience sampling reports. And yet, European American participants recalled the
week as more satisfying than Asian American participants, presumably because their
memory was guided by the individualistic norm that personal happiness is important and
desirable. Similarly, Robinson et al. (1998) found no gender differences in on-line reports
of emotion, but significant gender differences in retrospective reports such that women
recalled experiencing more emotions than men. Here, the memory bias was consistent with
the stereotype that women are the more emotional sex. Importantly, these studies showing
the influence of cultural norms on memory for emotions have not measured norms directly,
but instead have relied on demonstrating a lack of group differences in on-line reports and
significant group differences in retrospective reports. In a study of 41 nations, Diener et al.
(2000) asked participants to rate ‘‘the ideal level of life satisfaction the ideal person leading
the ideal life would feel’’ and found that countries with higher ratings of ideal life satis-
faction also had higher levels of self-reported life satisfaction. However, Diener et al. did
not measure on-line emotions, so it remains unclear whether ideal life satisfaction was
related to daily emotional experience or only global life satisfaction.
1.2 Affect Valuation Theory
Ideal affect refers to the amount of emotion a person would ideally like to feel. Tsai et al.
(2006) proposed in their Affect Valuation Theory that cultural factors account for varia-
tions in ideal affect while affective traits shape what they referred to as the ‘‘actual1’’
experience of emotions. In other words, culture determines what emotions people consider
desirable and the extent to which they prefer to feel them; immediate emotional reactions
to events and stimuli, in contrast, are mostly governed by temperament or possibly
neurobiological individual differences. To this we add that on-line emotions are also
1 Interestingly, the term ‘‘actual affect’’ which Tsai uses implies that one aspect of emotional experience is
the ‘‘real’’ emotion while other levels of emotional experience (e.g., memory for emotions) are somehow
less valid or veridical. A critical feature of the Time-sequential Model is that on-line, retrospective, and
global reports of emotion do not need to vie for the position of ‘‘true’’ emotion. We prefer to use the less
value-laden term ‘‘on-line emotions’’ to refer to immediate emotional responses or reactions.
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probably constrained by the immediate circumstances or the event. Consistent with Affect
Valuation Theory, Tsai et al. found that extraversion and neuroticism were more strongly
related to ‘‘actual affect’’ than to ideal affect. Cultural factors, on the other hand, were
more strongly associated with ideal affect than with ‘‘actual affect.’’
1.3 Ideal Affect and Memory for Emotions
Affect Valuation Theory does not distinguish among the many time frames which emotion
reports can reference. People can report their on-line emotional reactions, or they can make
evaluations over broader time frames such as the entire day, week, month, or year. At their
broadest, emotion reports reference global affect such as when researchers ask participants
to report how they ‘‘typically’’ feel (e.g., Tsai et al. 2006) or how they feel ‘‘in general.’’
Although Affect Valuation Theory states that ideal affect should only be weakly related to
emotional experience, it does not specify whether this relation would vary depending on
the time frame of the emotion reports. In other words, would ideal affect be more strongly
related to retrospective emotion reports than on-line emotion reports? Would ideal affect
be more strongly related to global reports than to retrospective reports of emotions from the
past week?
According to the Time-sequential Framework (Kim-Prieto et al. 2005), retrospective
accounts of emotional experience are more open to revision and reconstruction than on-line
emotional reports. Furthermore, cultural norms exert their strongest influence on memory
for emotions such that people are more likely to remember what is culturally valued.
Table 1 illustrates the relation of time frame of emotion reports to cultural norms and
memory reconstruction. As the time frame of reporting becomes more broad (e.g., from
reports of how one is feeling right now to reports of how one typically feels), we believe
that emotion reports become more open to revision and more susceptible to the influence of
culture. Thus, Integrating Affect Valuation Theory and the Time-sequential Framework,
we predicted that ideal affect would be more strongly related to retrospective reports than
to on-line reports of emotional experience, and that ideal affect would be most strongly
related to global emotion reports. To our knowledge, however, no study has directly
examined the relation between ideal affect, on-line affect, and memory for emotions.
1.4 The Significance of Ideal Affect and Memory for Emotions
Tsai and colleagues have demonstrated that ethnicity (2006), religious affiliation (Tsai
et al. 2007), and, to some extent, motivation (e.g., having influencing versus adjustment
motives, Tsai et al. 2007) shape the emotions people want to feel. Rather than simply
observing group differences in absolute levels of emotion, it is important to also consider
group differences within the context of differences in beliefs about emotions (e.g., how
desirable it is to feel certain states). Could group differences in ideal affect explain the
cultural differences researchers have observed in subjective well-being? For example,
cultures that value more positive emotion tend to report greater positive emotion (Diener
et al. 2000). The present study extends the research on affect valuation by showing that
ideal affect is primarily associated with reconstructed reports of emotion such as retro-
spective and global reports. Clarifying the relation between ideal, on-line, recalled, and
global affect will hopefully illuminate the temporal process of subjective well-being and
possibly explain cultural differences in emotion reports.
Ideal Affect and Memory of Emotions
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Understanding how people construct their memories of past emotional experiences is
important because our conceptions of our lives, especially meaningful (and therefore
usually emotional) experiences, are based primarily on what we recall. In fact, the memory
of one’s emotions during an experience has been found to be a better predictor of future
choice behaviors than on-line reactions (Wirtz et al. 2003). Specifically, participants in
Wirtz et al.’s (2003) study recorded their on-line emotions of fun and enjoyment during a
spring break vacation. Afterwards, participants reported how much fun and enjoyment they
remembered experiencing during the vacation. Wirtz et al. found that only the memory of
fun and enjoyment, and not on-line fun and enjoyment, predicted wanting to repeat the
experience (see also Oishi and Sullivan 2006). Similarly, when students decide whether to
take a similar class in the future (for example, when considering whether to take another
psychology course after having Introductory Psychology or whether to take another course
from the same professor), their decisions are more strongly influenced by their memories of
engagement during the course, than on-line engagement during the course (Scollon et al.
2007). These studies illustrate the profound influence of memory for emotions on people’s
life choices.
1.5 Study Overview and Predictions
Consistent with the idea that the memory of past emotional experiences is a dynamic,
reconstructed phenomenon whereas on-line reactions are not, we predicted the correlation
between ideal affect and retrospective emotion reports would be greater than the corre-
lation between ideal affect and on-line reports. Furthermore, ideal affect should be most
strongly related to global reports of emotion. We also expected the relation between ideal
affect and retrospective reports would be greater for pleasant than unpleasant emotion. This
asymmetry is consistent with research showing that pleasant emotion may be more open to
sociocultural influences whereas unpleasant emotion is more strongly tied to neurobio-
logical mechanisms (Eid and Diener 2001; Tellegen et al. 1988). In addition, Tsai et al.
(2006) noted that ideal affect primarily involves positive feelings.
A secondary goal of the present study was to clarify the relation of affective traits such
as extraversion and neuroticism to what Tsai et al. referred to as ‘‘actual affect.’’ A closer
examination of Tsai et al.’s methods reveals that their measure of ‘‘actual affect’’ was, in
fact, a global report of emotion. Instead of rating immediate emotional responses and
reactions, as in experience sampling studies, participants rated ‘‘how much [they]
TYPICALLY [felt]’’ emotions (original capitalized). Past research (e.g., Feldman Barrett
1997; Scollon et al. 2004) has shown that generalized beliefs about one’s emotionality,
such as extraversion and neuroticism, predict memory for emotion even after controlling
for on-line reports. In some cases, generalized knowledge has been shown to be as strong
or stronger a predictor of retrospective emotion reports than on-line reports (Scollon et al.
2004). Thus, it is no surprise that Tsai et al. found a relation between affective traits and
their measure of ‘‘actual affect.’’ A more precise test of Affect Valuation Theory would
have to show that extraversion and neuroticism are related to emotional reactions by
measuring emotional experience as it occurs or as close to the emotional reactions in time
as possible. Thus, the second goal of this study was to provide a stronger test of Affect
Valuation Theory by measuring emotional reactions using experience sampling
methodology.
Replicating Tsai et al. (2006), we expected extraversion and neuroticism to be only
weakly related to ideal affect. Extending Tsai et al.’s research, we predicted extraversion
Ideal Affect and Memory of Emotions
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and neuroticism would be more strongly related to on-line reports of emotion than to ideal
affect, and that ideal affect would be unrelated to on-line emotion.
2 Method
2.1 Participants
Eighty-seven undergraduate students from upper division psychology courses participated
for extra credit. Four participants were excluded for failing to complete all measures,
leaving data from 83 participants (60 females, 23 males), ages 18–44 (M = 21.18,
SD = 3.34) for analyses.
2.2 Measures
2.2.1 Ideal Affect2
Participants rated 12 emotions (happy, joy, sociable, excited, proud, calm, sad, guilty,
worried, anxious, irritated, bored) on how much the ‘‘ideal person leading the ideal life’’
would experience them, using a 1 (‘‘never’’) to 7 (‘‘always’’) scale. We created positive
(a = .79, six items) and negative ideal affect (a = .81, six items) indices by averaging the
ratings of like-valenced emotions.
2.2.2 Global Emotion Reports
Participants rated the same 12 emotions for how much they ‘‘GENERALLY’’ experience
them using a 0 (‘‘never experience’’) to 6 (‘‘always experience’’) scale. Later we recoded
participants’ ratings to a 1–7 scale to facilitate comparison with the ideal affect ratings. We
created positive (a = .75, six items) and negative global affect (a = .62, six items) indices
by averaging the ratings of like-valenced emotions.
Participants completed the ideal and global affect measures at the beginning of the
study, prior to beginning the experience sampling portion of the study.
2.2.3 On-line Emotion Reports
For the 7-day experience sampling portion of the study, participants carried a handheld
computer (i.e., personal digital assistant or PDA) with them at all times. Using the
Experience Sampling Program 4.0 (ESP: Feldman Barrett and Barrett 2005), we pro-
grammed the computers to sound an alarm at seven random times throughout a 13-h
waking day (either 9 a.m. to 10 p.m. or 10 a.m. to 11 p.m.). We instructed participants on
2 Participants also rated each emotion on three other dimensions (appropriateness, desirability, and func-
tionality or adaptiveness) which were not used in the present analyses. Separate analyses on the other
dimensions did not produce consistent results, and a composite of all four dimensions yielded results that
were weaker but modestly consistent with our predictions. Given that we have greater theoretical under-
standing of ideal affect (e.g., Diener et al. 2000; Tsai et al. 2006, 2007) than other norm measures, we chose
to report findings with respect to ideal affect only.
C. N. Scollon et al.
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how to complete the experience sampling questionnaire on the handheld computer when
signaled. Participants had up to 30 min to respond when signaled, after which time the
survey was no longer accessible. Participants were instructed to respond to the question-
naire according to how they were feeling just before they were signaled to reduce reactivity
effects. The average response rate was 84.73% (SD = 12.79).
The on-line survey asked a series of questions such as ‘‘How happy were you feeling?’’
sampling the same 12 emotions that were assessed in the ideal affect and retrospective
measures. Participants rated the intensity of each emotion on a 1 (‘‘Not at all’’) to 5 (‘‘with
maximum intensity’’) scale.
2.2.4 Retrospective Emotion Reports
At the conclusion of the experience sampling portion of the study, students recalled the
percentage of time they felt each of the 12 emotions during the experience sampling week
(i.e., ‘‘during the week in which you carried the palm pilot’’). We informed them that
‘‘numbers do not need to add up to 100% since you may have felt more than one emotion at
a time.’’ We again aggregated the emotions to form pleasant and unpleasant emotion
indices. Students completed the retrospective measures at the end of the experience
sampling week, one week later, and 2 weeks later. Alphas ranged from .74 to .87
(M = .81). Results did not vary for the different retrospective measures. Therefore, we
took the average of the three assessments as our retrospective measure.
2.2.5 Extraversion and Neuroticism
Ten items from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg 1999) assessed extra-
version and 10 items assessed neuroticism. Students read a list of 20 statements that could
describe them, for example, ‘‘I am often down in the dumps.’’ Using a 1–5 scale, where 1
indicated ‘‘very inaccurate’’ and 5 indicated ‘‘very accurate,’’ participants rated the extent
to which the statement accurately described them (extraversion: a = .86; neuroticism:
a = .82).
3 Results
3.1 On-line Frequency of Emotions
With potentially 49 on-line assessments per person (seven per day for 7 days), we needed
to transform the data into a meaningful unit that would succinctly summarize each person’s
on-line emotional experience. Although experience sampling data allow us to capture a
number of features of a person’s on-line experience including the intensity of on-line
emotions, conceptually subjective well-being has been linked to frequency of emotion
rather than intensity (see Diener et al. 1991). Thus, we created indices of frequency of on-
line pleasant and unpleasant emotion. Note that the retrospective emotion measure was
also a frequency measure that directly mapped onto the on-line frequency scores.
Following the procedures of Scollon et al. (2004), we transformed the ratings of each of
the 12 emotions into dichotomous variables indicating whether the emotion was experi-
enced (i.e., a response greater than one) or not (i.e., a response of one). We then computed
Ideal Affect and Memory of Emotions
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the proportion of time each discrete emotion was reported over the entire experience
sampling period (i.e., week). Thus, frequency values reflect the percentage of time an
emotion was experienced and do not take into account the intensity of the emotion. As with
our other measures, we aggregated like-valenced emotions to form on-line pleasant and
unpleasant emotion scores. To calculate the internal consistency of the on-line affect
measures, we treated the proportion of time the participant experienced each emotion over
the week as an item. Therefore, on-line pleasant affect consisted of six ‘‘items’’ (proportion
of time reporting happiness, proportion of time reporting joy, etc.) and yielded an alpha
value of .86. Likewise, on-line unpleasant affect consisted of 6 ‘‘items’’ and yielded an
alpha value of .76. Table 2 presents the means for on-line frequency of emotion, ideal
affect, retrospective, and global emotion reports. Table 3 presents the intercorrelations
among like-valenced measures.
3.2 Is Ideal Affect More Strongly Related to Memory for Emotions than On-line
Emotions?
To address our hypothesis that ideal affect operates on recalled emotions, not on on-line
experiences, we examined the relationship between ideal affect, on-line emotion, and
retrospective emotion. Consistent with our predictions, ideal positive affect was signifi-
cantly correlated with retrospective positive affect (r = .26, p \ .02) and global positive
affect (r = .33, p \ .01). Meanwhile, the correlation between ideal affect and on-line
Table 2 Means (and standard deviations)
Positive affect Negative affect
On-line reports 78.0% (15.1) 45.62% (15.8)
Ideal affect 5.98 (.69) 2.13 (.82)
Retrospective reports 48.4% (18.4) 26.4% (14.2)
Global reports 4.76 (.81) 3.21 (.73)
Extraversion 3.24 (.72)
Neuroticism 2.56 (.79)
On-line and retrospective reports ranged from 0% to 100%. Ideal and global affects were rated on a 1–7
scale. Extraversion and neuroticism ranged from 1 to 5
Table 3 Correlations among affective measures
Global Memory On-line Ideal affect Extraversion Neuroticism
Global – .52** .30** .11 -.25* .58**
Memory .57** – .35** .08 -.16 .43**
On-line .52** .66** – .07 -.09 .27*
Ideal Affect .33** .26* .16 – .14 -.04
Extraversion .47** .34** .35** .23* – -.22*
Neuroticism -.66** -.40** -.33** -.27** -.22* –
*p \ .05, **p \ .01
Below diagonal = Positive affect
Above diagonal = Negative affect
C. N. Scollon et al.
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positive affect did not reach statistical significance (r = .16, p = n.s.). Although the
correlations were in the direction we predicted, a significance test (Steiger 1980) of
the difference between the ideal-retrospective correlation and the ideal-on-line correlation
emerged as non-significant (t (80) = 1.14, p = .26). However, significance testing (Steiger
1980) of the difference between the ideal-global correlation and the ideal-on-line corre-
lation emerged as marginally significant (t (80) = 1.63, p = .11).
We also tested the relative influence of on-line positive affect versus ideal positive
affect on recalled positive emotion reports using multiple regression. Not surprisingly, on-
line positive affect strongly predicted recalled positive affect (b = .64, t = 7.7, p \ .001).
And yet, even after controlling for on-line positive affect, ideal positive affect marginally
predicted recalled reports (b = .16, t = 1.9, p = .06). The effects were even more pro-
nounced when we regressed on-line positive affect and ideal positive affect on global
positive affect. On-line positive affect strongly predicted global positive affect (b = .48,
t = 5.1, p \ .001), but ideal positive affect also contributed to global reports of positive
emotion (b = .26, t = 2.7, p \ .001). What these results suggest is that when people
remember their past emotional experiences, their memories are based in reality to a large
extent. However, beliefs about the emotions one would like to feel also become incor-
porated into the memory, albeit to a lesser extent.
None of the correlations with ideal negative affect emerged as significant. That ideal
affect only had an impact on positive emotion reports suggests that the positive emotion
system is more susceptible to memory revision that involves cultural influences than the
negative emotion system is. This finding is consistent with previous work (Scollon et al.
2004) which found larger cultural differences in positive emotion reports than in negative
emotion reports.
3.3 Do Traits Shape On-line Emotion But Not Ideal Emotions?
Following Tsai et al., we computed partial correlations to capture the ‘‘pure’’ components
of ideal and on-line emotion. For example, when we correlated traits with on-line emotion,
we controlled for ideal emotion. Likewise, when we correlated traits with ideal emotion,
we controlled for on-line emotions. Table 4 presents partial and zero-order correlations.
Consistent with Affect Valuation Theory, extraversion was a stronger predictor of on-
line pleasant affect (r = .35 and p = .33, controlling for ideal pleasant affect) than ideal
Table 4 Zero-order and partial correlations between traits and ideal affect and on-line affect
Extraversion Neuroticism
Zero-order Partial Zero-order Partial
On-line positive affecta .35*** .33*** -.33*** -.31***
Ideal positive affectb .23** .18* -.27*** -.19*
On-line negative affectc -.09 -.10 .27** .27**
Ideal negative affectd .14 .14 -.04 -.06
*p \ .10, **p \ .05, ***p \ .01
a Controlling for ideal positive affect in partial correlations
b Controlling for on-line positive affect in partial correlations
c Controlling for ideal negative affect in partial correlations
d Controlling for on-line negative affect in partial correlations
Ideal Affect and Memory of Emotions
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pleasant affect (r = .23 and p = .18, controlling for on-line pleasant affect). Likewise,
neuroticism had stronger associations with on-line negative affect (r = .27 and p = .27,
controlling for ideal negative affect), compared to ideal negative affect (r = -.04 and
p = -.06, controlling for on-line negative affect). Extraversion did not predict any of the
measures of negative affect. Neuroticism negatively predicted positive affect measures,
and again, relations to on-line pleasant affect (r = -.33 and p = -.31, controlling for
ideal pleasant affect) were greater than relations to ideal pleasant affect (r = -.27 and
p = -.19, controlling for on-line pleasant emotion).
4 Discussion
We replicated results from the pilot study using a more ecologically valid measure of
momentary feelings. Consistent with the idea that immediate emotional reactions are not
directly encoded in memory, and that heuristic information such as cultural norms and
values help individuals to reconstruct the emotional experience, ideal affect correlated
more strongly with memory for emotions than with on-line emotions. Thus, our results
confirm that retrospective reports are indeed dynamic reflections of the way emotions are
shaped and modified through time (Kim-Prieto et al. 2005). Furthermore, because we used
experience sampling methodology in the present study, we can be more confident that our
results were not due to artifacts. That is, the lower correlations between ideal affect and on-
line emotion cannot be due to range restriction arising from neutral moods, as was possible
in the pilot study. Instead, ideal affect genuinely appears to have minimal relation to on-
line emotions compared to memory for emotions. In addition, the present study eliminated
the alternative explanation that ideal affect was simply more strongly associated with more
stable measures of affect that average minor influences on affect over time. Since both
retrospective and on-line reports were based on the same week-long time frame, neither
measure was subject to any whimsical influences on mood (as in one-time assessments of
on-line emotion). In fact, on-line measures exhibited very high reliability (see also Scollon
et al. 2004).
Second, the correlation between ideal affect and memory was stronger for positive
emotions than for negative emotions. Our finding is consistent with past research (Scollon
et al. 2004) which has shown that the cultural variability of negative emotions is very
small, and in some cases (e.g., sadness) effectively zero. Similarly, Eid and Diener (2001)
similarly found greater influence of norms on positive emotions than on negative emotions.
In behavioral genetics, Tellegen et al. (1988) found greater influence of socialization on
positive emotion, whereas negative emotions were more strongly tied to heritability and
temperament. Along these same lines, Tsai et al. (2006) have shown that people’s ideal
affect tends to be more positive than ‘‘actual affect,’’ suggesting that ideal affect primarily
involves the positive emotion system. The present findings add to a growing literature
which shows that negative emotion has greater constraints than positive emotion, a finding
which is intriguing in its own right and also important for a general theory of emotions.
Third, consistent with Affect Valuation Theory (Tsai et al. 2006), traits correlated more
strongly with on-line emotions than with ideal emotion, suggesting that on-line emotional
reactions are indeed more the product of temperament than cultural values. Our findings
provide an especially rigorous test of Affect Valuation Theory because we used experience
sampling methodology to capture emotional reactions or ‘‘actual affect.’’ Unlike on-line
measures, retrospective and global measures are susceptible to memory biases that make
them inherently related to self-knowledge such as trait affect.
C. N. Scollon et al.
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What do our findings suggest about the relation between affective traits and the different
levels of emotional self-reports? The present study found that extraversion and neuroticism
were related to on-line emotion reports. However, previous research (Scollon et al. 2004)
has shown that extraversion and neuroticism also predict memory for emotions above and
beyond on-line reports. We believe these findings are not incompatible. Extraversion and
neuroticism influence multiple levels of emotion reports, but for different reasons.
Extraversion and neuroticism bear strong relation to on-line reports because both are
influenced by underlying individual differences in neurobiology and physiology. Extra-
version and neuroticism are related to recall emotion reports based on a different
mechanism. When people recall their past feelings, they often rely on global self-
knowledge, particularly knowledge about the emotional self, to help fill in the gaps of their
memory. Thus, the effect of affective traits on memory for emotions is due to their links to
the self-concept. In fact, Kim-Prieto et al. (2005) noted that the reason why personality has
such a pervasive influence on subjective well-being is that it operates on multiple aspects
of the emotion process.
4.1 Implications
A consistent finding in the subjective well-being literature is that Asians and Asian-
Americans report lower life satisfaction and pleasant emotion, and greater negative
emotion than European Americans and Hispanics (e.g., Scollon et al. 2004). International
data (see Diener and Suh 1999) have yielded similar results with many Western societies
(e.g., North and South America, Europe) reporting higher subjective well-being than
Eastern nations (e.g., China, Japan, South Korea). These cross-national differences can
only be partially accounted for by differences in national wealth. In fact, countries such as
Colombia are far poorer than Japan, and yet, report higher well-being. The present study
offers one possible explanation for the cross-cultural differences in global and retrospective
reports of emotion: Different cultures hold different norms regarding the value of certain
emotions, and these normative beliefs influence how people recall their emotions. Ideal
affect has less influence on the momentary emotional reactions which are constrained by
temperament and situational factors (see also Tsai et al. 2006). Memory for emotions, like
all other forms of memory, is a social construction, one that is guided by beliefs (and
cultural practices that shape our beliefs) about what is worth remembering (Fivush 1994).
Thus, a culture that values happiness might remember happiness more so than another
culture that places less value on happiness.
Findings from the present studies also point to more practical considerations in the study
and measurement of emotion. Specifically, most researchers use retrospective and global
reports of emotion, and not experience sampling measures. As we have demonstrated,
because values become incorporated into memory for emotions, retrospective reports of
emotions may not give an accurate account of an individual’s on-line emotional experi-
ences. The precision of such instruments can be improved to the extent that we understand
the sources, other than experiences, that influence retrospective instruments. Understand-
ing the level at which values operates on emotion and how ideal affect systematically
influence retrospective reports provides valuable information that could improve future
studies and provide a more complete account of a patient’s emotional life. Given that
norms about emotional experience vary widely from culture to culture (Eid and Diener
2001; Kim-Prieto et al. 2004), the present findings suggest that cultural differences in
emotion may be inflated when retrospective and global reports are used.
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4.2 Limitations and Future Directions
Although the present studies provide important insight into the process of memory for
emotions, they represent only a starting point. First, although we found that ideal positive
affect correlated with retrospective and global positive affect but not on-line positive
affect, we could not show that these correlations were statistically different based on
Steiger’s (1980) test of dependent correlations. Although the pattern of correlations was
entirely consistent with what is predicted by the Time Sequential Framework (Kim-Prieto
et al. 2005), future research with larger sample sizes should aim to uncover whether these
correlations are truly different.
Second, our approach has been to treat ideal affect as heuristic information that ‘‘fills in
the gaps’’ of memory. However, it is certainly possible that other mechanisms could be
driving the relation between memory for emotions and norms as well. Future research
should examine whether normative beliefs about emotion influence attention to certain
emotions, encoding of the emotional event, rehearsal, or retrieval. For example, someone
who values happiness might be more likely to attend to happy reactions, encode happy
events, rehearse happy memories by talking to others about the event, or be better at
retrieving the memory because it was ‘‘tagged’’ as interesting or important.
Finally, research on memory for emotions and decision-making raises intriguing pos-
sibilities for the study of decision making and consumer choice behavior. For example, two
people who take a similar vacation and experience enjoyment to the same degree during
the vacation might not remember the vacation in the same way due to their beliefs about
the value of enjoyment. People who value happiness more might recall more happy
moments, and their happy memories, in turn, might guide their decision to repeat the
experience which might lead to subsequent increases in overall happiness (Lyubomirsky
and Tucker 1998).
Acknowledgements We would like to thank all the students who volunteered to participate in the study
and Christie Lynch and Lincoln Lim for their assistance with data collection. We also thank Drs. Charles
Lord, Charles Bond, Jr., Donald Dansereau, and Ed Diener for their comments on earlier versions of this
manuscript.
References
Diener, E., Colvin, C. R., Pavot, W. G., & Allman, A. (1991). The psychic costs of intense positive affect.
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 61, 492–503.
Diener, E., Scollon, C. K., Oishi, S., Dzokoto, V., & Suh, E. M. (2000). Positivity and the construction of
life satisfaction judgments: Global happiness is not the sum of its parts. Journal of Happiness Studies, 1,
159–176.
Diener, E., & Suh, E. M. (1999). National differences in subjective well-being. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener,
& N. Schwarz (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of a hedonic psychology (pp. 434–450). NewYork:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Eid, M., & Diener, E. (2001). Norms for experiencing emotions in different cultures: Inter- and intranational
differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 869–885.
Feldman Barrett, L. (1997). The relationships among momentary emotion experiences, personality
descriptions, and retrospective ratings of emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23,
1100–1110.
Feldman Barrett, L., & Barrett, D. (2005). The experience sampling program: Version 4.0.
Fivush, R. (1994). Constructing the self in parent-child conversations. In U. Neisser, & R. Fivush (Eds.), The
remembering self: Construction and accuracy in the self-narrative (pp. 136–157). Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
C. N. Scollon et al.
123
Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, public-domain, personality inventory measuring the lower-level
facets of several five-factor models. In I. Mervielde, I. Deary, F. De Fruyt, & F. Ostendorf (Eds.),
Personality psychology in Europe: Vol. 7 (pp. 7–28). Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University
Press.
Kim-Prieto, C., Diener, E., Tamir, M., Scollon, C. N., & Diener, M. (2005). Integrating the diverse defi-
nitions of happiness: A time-sequential framework of subjective well-being. Journal of Happiness
Studies, 6, 261–300.
Kim-Prieto, C., Fujita, F., & Diener, E. (2004). Culture and patterns of emotional experience. Unpublished
manuscript.
Lyubomirsky, S., & Tucker, K. L. (1998). Implications of individual differences in subjective happiness for
perceiving, interpreting, and thinking about life events. Motivation and Emotion, 22, 155–186.
Oishi, S. (2002). Experiencing and remembering of well-being: A cross-cultural analysis. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1398–1406.
Oishi, S., & Sullivan, H. W. (2006). The predictive value of daily vs. retrospective well-being judgments in
relationship stability. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 460–470.
Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility model of
emotional self-report. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 934–960.
Robinson, M. D., Johnson, J. T., & Shields, S. A. (1998). The gender heuristic and the database: Factors
affecting the perception of gender-related differences in the experience and display of emotions. Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 206–219.
Scollon, C. N., Caldwell, A. E., Howard, A. H., & Birchfield, T. (2007). Will students take another fun
class? It depends on how they remember it. Manuscript in progress.
Scollon, C. N., Diener, E., Oishi, S, & Biswas-Diener, R. (2004). Emotions across cultures and methods.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 304–326.
Steiger, J. H. (1980). Testing for comparing elements of a correlation matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 87,
245–251.
Tellegen, A., Lykken, D. T., Bouchard, T. J., Wilcox, K. J., Segal, N. L., & Rich, S. (1988). Personality
similarity in twins reared apart and together. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1031–
1039.
Tsai, J. L., Knutson, B., & Fung, H. H. (2006). Cultural variation in affect valuation. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 90, 288–307.
Tsai, J. L., Miao, F. F., & Seppala, E. (2007). Good feelings in Christianity and Buddhism: Religious
differences in ideal affect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 409–421.
Tsai, J. L., Miao, F. F., Seppala, E., Fung, H. H., & Yeung, D. Y. (2007). Influence and adjustment goals:
Sources of cultural differences in ideal affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 1102–
1117.
Wirtz, D., Kruger, J., Scollon, C. N., & Diener, E. (2003). What to do on spring break? The role of predicted,
on-line, and remembered experience in future choice. Psychological Science, 14, 520–524.
Ideal Affect and Memory of Emotions
123
